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1. Introduction 
 Income taxes are usually progressive in developed countries. The justification 
is to benefit the poor by income redistribution from the rich, perhaps at the cost of 
reduced efficiency. The idea slipped down the political agenda in the U.S. during 
Bush’s years, while it is gaining momentum in the new Obama administration. An 
alternative to the progressive tax system is a flat tax combined with a basic income, 
which reduces transaction costs and incentive complications. It has gained increasing 
support from various parts of the political spectrum. Several Eastern European 
countries have moved in this direction. A populist proposal has been made in the US 
to replace all welfare payments by a $10,000 p.a. basic income, combined with a flat 
tax (Murray 2006). Though generally considered sub-optimal, flat taxes have attracted 
serious interests in both politics and academia. Atkinson (1995) provides a 
comprehensive treatment of this issue.  
 Plausibly, administrative costs of multi-band tax systems increase with the 
number of bands, while the marginal benefit decreases. The advantage of progressive 
taxes over flat tax, if exists, can be best demonstrated by two-band taxes. In fact, 
many countries have slimmed down multiple tax bands to mainly two, such as in U.K. 
The literature has examined the two-band tax structure to justify progressive taxes or 
question their desirability (Sheshinski [1989], Slemrod et al [1994], and Kaplow 
[2008]). If we do not find the optimal tax rate for high income significantly higher 
than the rate for low income, the justification for progressive taxes becomes dubious. 
In this paper we investigate whether this is usually, or under which conditions, true. 
Starting from Mirlees (1971), economists have made serious efforts to 
understand the optimal tax structure. Following Mirlees’ model of general non-linear 
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taxes but finite income, Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977) show that the marginal tax 
rates for the highest and lowest income earners should be zero. But little can be said 
about the rest of the population without further specifying income distributions, utility 
functions and welfare objectives. These specifications make significant differences to 
the basic pattern of the optimal tax structure (see Tuomala [1984, 1990], Kanbur and 
Tuomala [1994], Dahan and Strawczynski (2000), Saez [2001], Tarkiainen and 
Tuomala [2007]). The differences are often too large for policy makers to follow one 
recommendation or the other. For instance, Diamond (1998) and Salanie (2003) 
obtain U–shaped tax curves, and Hindricks et al (2006) find increasing optimal 
average tax rates. But Boadway et al (2000), Hashimzade and Myles (2007) show that 
inverted U-shaped tax curves are optimal. These conflicting results do not tell us 
whether more realistic two-band taxes should be progressive or not.  
Sheshinski (1989) is the first to examine two-band taxes and, as an exception 
in the literature, assumes general utility functions and income distributions. He finds 
that the optimal taxes cannot be regressive under utilitarian and max-min welfare 
functions. This is rather surprising given the conflicting results on non-linear taxes. 
Indeed, Slemrod et al (1994) point out that Sheshinski’s proof for the utilitarian 
welfare case is flawed, because it ignores a possible discrete jump in the tax revenue 
from marginal households whose labour supplies are not unique. They further 
demonstrate that, to maximize weighted utility of two groups with different income 
levels, the tax rates can be either progressive or regressive. Moreover, using a CES 
utility function and a lognormal wage distribution, their numerical simulation shows 
that the optimal taxes are regressive under the utilitarian welfare and a rather 
egalitarian objective with heavy emphasis on the wellbeing of the poor. Salanie 
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(2003), Hindricks and Myles (2006) also obtain regressive taxes in a two-group 
economy, supporting the findings of Slemrod et al.  
While these studies tell us that regressive taxes cannot be dismissed, certain 
questions remain unanswered. First, we do not know how likely the optimal two-band 
taxes are progressive or regressive. As Sheshinski (1989) assumes a general income 
distribution, the discrete jump in tax revenue might be insignificant for some or 
possibly most distributions. Should taxes be progressive in these cases? If so, the 
examples of Slemrod et al may be exceptional rather than general.  
Secondly, the existing research has focused on utilitarian and max-min welfare 
functions. The former does not favor income redistribution and is unlikely to justify 
progressive taxes. The latter is often viewed as the most likely to yield progressive 
taxes. However, as demonstrated by Sheshinski’s example, it needs not yield more 
progressive taxes than the utilitarian welfare. Then these two welfare functions may 
not suffice to dismiss progressive taxes, and the question should be examined under 
alternative welfare functions. In the real world the purpose of progressive taxes is not 
to benefit everyone equally or a few worst-off individuals exclusively, but to help a 
large number of poor people. The desired income redistribution is supposedly to 
benefit these low-income earners at the expense of the high-income earners. The 
literature has not explicitly investigated this type of welfare functions.  
Thirdly, the literature has not clarified how the optimal tax structure depends 
on income distributions, which differ greatly across countries and may change 
dramatically as recently in the UK and US. Conclusions based on specific 
distributions are not reliable. We need simple criteria to evaluate the desirability of 
progressive taxes based on reasonable information about income distributions. 
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In the present paper we try to answer these questions. We first consider 
utilitarian and max-min welfare functions. In contrast to Sheshinski’s claim, we show 
that the optimal taxes are generally not progressive. Then, we examine the optimal 
taxes under new welfare functions, the total and weighted utility of the poor. We find 
necessary conditions for progressive taxes, which only depend on aggregate and 
easily observable features of income distributions. We further discuss the validity of 
these conditions using plausible income distributions. 
 The plan of the paper is to develop the model in the next section 2. Sections 3 
and 4 show optimal taxes are generally not progressive under utilitarian and max-min 
welfare functions. In sections 5 and 6 we derive necessary conditions for progressive 
taxes to maximize total and weighted utility of the poor. The last section concludes. 
2. The Model 
 We assume that a population, normalized to unity, consists of a continuum of 
households, whose wage is denoted by w, and is distributed on [a,b], where a ≥ 0, b is 
either finite or infinite. The cumulative function is denoted by G(w). A household’s 
pre-tax earnings y are proportional to its wage w and labour supply x, i.e., y = wx.  
 The government observes earnings, and imposes two tax rates accordingly. 
We let t1 be the marginal tax rate applicable to earnings up to a threshold y . For 
earnings exceeding y , the tax rate is t2. If a household does not earn more than y , its 
after-tax earnings are wx(1 −  t1). Otherwise the after-tax earnings are wx(1 − t2) + 
y (t2 −  t1). We let w  be the lowest wage of the households who pay t2.  
 Besides wages, every household receives a basic income, denoted by B. Given 
our unit population B represents the basic income for each household as well as for 
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the total population. The utility function for every household is quasi-linear in 
income. Given t1, t2 and y , the utility functions are assumed to be: 
 V1 = wx(1−  t1) – 
1 1/
1 1/
x
ε
+
+
 + B    for w ≤ w  (1) 
 V2 = wx(1 −  t2) + y (t2 −  t1) – 
1 1/
1 1/
x
ε
+
+
 + B  for w > w  (2) 
 Parameter ε  represents the elasticity of labor supply. We assume 0 < ε < 1, 
implying inelastic supply, which is consistent with empirical observations. This type 
of utility function has been used in the literature (e.g. Atkinson, 1995).  
 All tax revenue is spent on B after a fixed expenditure on public goods, P. 
Throughout the paper we assume that P is sufficiently low so that B can be positive if 
this is desirable. For simplicity we ignore P as it does not affect our solutions. Then 
we can write the basic income B as equal to the tax revenue:  
 B = t1 ( )
w
a
wxdG w  + t2 ( )
b
w
wxdG w − (t2 −  t1) y [1 − G( w )]  (3) 
 If there is no tax, every household’s labor supply can be solved from the first-
order condition w – x1/ε = 0, as x = wε. This implies optimal-no-tax-earnings (ONTE) 
wε+1. We denote wε+1 by z. To simplify notations, we focus on the distribution of z, 
instead of w. The cumulative and density functions of z are F(z) and f(z), which can be 
derived from the wage distribution. The minimum and maximum ONTE, a1+ε and 
b1+ε, are denoted by m and M respectively. For a household with wage w , its ONTE is 
denoted by z . Obviously F( z ) = G( w ).  
 In the following sections, we examine under various welfare functions if or 
under which conditions the optimal taxes are progressive, i.e., *2t  > 
*
1t .   
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3. Utilitarian Welfare  
 Following the literature, we choose tax rates t1, t2 and threshold earnings y  to 
maximize utilitarian welfare. Sheshinski argues that if t1 > t2, there is no interior 
solution for y , hence the optimal taxes cannot be regressive. His proof is flawed, as 
shown by Slemrod et al, as he ignores a possible jump in the tax revenue. However, as 
the magnitude of this jump depends on the income distribution, it is unclear whether 
his result still holds for some distributions. To solve this puzzle, we assume a general 
income distribution, which allows a minimum impact of the revenue jump.  
 We first consider households’ labor supply given progressive taxes, i.e., t1 < t2. 
For any y , we can divide households into three groups according to their ONTE z. 
The households with z ≤ y /(1 – t1)ε choose x = wε(1 – t1)ε, and obtain pre-tax earnings 
z(1 – t1)ε ≤ y ; those with z > y /(1 – t2)ε choose x = wε(1 – t2)ε, and earn z(1 – t2)ε > 
y ; those in the interval y /(1 – t1)ε < z ≤ y /(1 – t2)ε would choose x = y /w and just 
earn pre-tax earnings y  (bunching).  
To simplify our proof, we temporarily modify households’ bunching behavior 
as follows. We allow those bunching households to pay the lower tax rate t1 for 
earnings beyond y . Then their work efforts will not stop at y /w, but continue up to 
the first-order condition w(1 − t1) – x1/ε = 0, which implies x = wε(1 − t1)ε. This special 
treatment gives these households higher utility and adds extra tax revenue. Thus, it 
exaggerates the benefit of progressive taxes.   
 Now we have just two groups of households, separated by z  = y /(1 – t2)ε. 
Substituting their efforts wε(1 – t1)ε and wε(1 – t2)ε into (1) and (2), and denoting w1+ε 
by z, we obtain the following maximized utility: 
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 1
ˆV  = 
1 
1(1 )
1
z t
ε
+
−
+
 + B    for z ≤ 
2(1 )
y
t ε−
   
2
ˆV  = 
1 
2(1 )
1
z t
ε
+
−
+
 + (t2 −  t1) y  + B   for z > 
2(1 )
y
t ε−
.   
Integrating 1ˆV  over [m, z ], 2ˆV  over [ z , M], and adding them together, we get 
the utilitarian welfare, over valuated due to our special treatment. 
W = 
1 
1(1 )
1
t
ε
+
−
+
( )
z
m
zdF z + 
1 
2(1 )
1
t
ε
+
−
+
( )
M
z
zdF z  + (t2 −  t1)[1 – F( z )] y  + B 
( )
z
m
zdF z and ( )
M
z
zdF z are the total ONTE of two groups of households with z 
≤ z  and z > z . We denote them by Z1 and Z2 respectively. Using these notations and 
substituting the optimal efforts into (3), we get the over-valued basic income: 
B’ = t1(1 – t1)εZ1 + t2(1 – t2)εZ2 – (t2 −  t1)[1 – F( z )] y     (4) 
 Plug (4) into function W above, we have our over-valued utilitarian welfare: 
W = 11
1
tε
ε
+
+
(1 – t1)εZ1 + 211
tε
ε
+
+
(1 – t2)εZ2    (5) 
 We can show that, given t1 < t2, there is no interior solution for y  to maximize 
(5). Although (5) over valuates the welfare, it coincides with the true welfare when y  
takes an extreme value such that no bunching could occur. Hence, no interior solution 
for y  exists when we consider the true welfare function either (see Appendix A).  
 Proposition 1: The taxes maximizing utilitarian welfare are not progressive.   
 Hence the regressive taxes found by Slemrod et al (1994) represent a general 
case. Sheshinski (1989) argues that the optimal taxes must be progressive if the poor 
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have sufficiently higher marginal utility of income than the rich1. This cannot happen 
here since our quasi-linear utility implies an identical marginal utility for all. We will 
show in section 5 that even a maximum gap between marginal utilities is not 
sufficient for progressive taxes. So to justify progressive taxes under utilitarian 
welfare requires complicated twists on utility functions.  
4. Max-min objective 
Sheshinski (1989) claims that the optimal taxes cannot be regressive under a 
max-min objective. He argues that, if taxes are regressive there is no interior solution 
for y , because a higher y  always raises tax revenue. Unfortunately, this argument is 
flawed again. When t1 > t2 and y  increases, households who still earn more than y  
will pay more taxes. But some households will cut earnings below y  after its 
increase, and pay less tax. If this effect dominates the positive impact on tax revenue, 
the total tax revenue may fall, and y  may have an interior solution.  
This error is similar to that pointed out by Slemrod et al (1994) for the 
utilitarian welfare case. However, they do not explicitly discuss the case of the max-
min objective, nor provide an example of regressive taxes. It is worthwhile to give a 
counter example to Sheshinski’s claim. We use an extreme case of our utility function 
with ε = 1, and assume three households with wages w0 = 0, w1 = 1 and w2 = 2 . As 
the worst-off household earns no income, the max-min objective is to maximize the 
basic income. We can show the maximum revenue of 9/8 is obtained by *1t  = ¾, 
*
2t  = 
0, and y * = 5/42. So taxes can be regressive under the max-min objective. 
                                                
1
 He does not provide a concrete example as his condition involves unsolved variables such as y .  
2
 If both households pay *2t , another solution is 
*
1t  = 1, 
*
2t  = ¼, y * = 3/8, and the same revenue 9/8.  
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 Besides his (flawed) theoretical argument, Sheshinski (1989) gives an example 
where “the optimum marginal tax increases moderately from 20 to 29 percent”. 
However, he soon recognizes that, “Allowing for two different marginal rates shows 
that the linear tax schedule, with 1 – β  = 0.5, is optimum!” (p. 212). This contradicts 
his claim that the progressive taxes of 20% and 29% are truly optimal. The next 
question is: Can optimal taxes be progressive under the max-min objective?  
 To answer this question, we first consider a special case. In our model, when 
m = 0, the worst-off households earn no income, so the max-min objective is to 
maximize the basic income. Our earlier example is such a case. To choose optimal 
taxes maximizing tax revenue, we now derive the true function of basic income, 
allowing bunching behavior. Recall that given t1 < t2, households are divided into 
three groups. Those with z > z  = y /(1 – t2)ε choose x = wε(1 − t2)ε; those with z ≤ e  
≡ y /(1 – t1)ε choose x = wε(1 − t1)ε; the remaining ones with e  < z ≤ z  choose x = 
y /w and just earn y . The total tax revenue from the three groups is: 
B = t1(1 – t1)ε ( )
e
m
zdF z  + t1 y ( )
z
e
dF z  + t2(1 – t2)ε ( )
M
z
zdF z  – (t2 −  t1)[1 – F( z )] y (6) 
 We examine if the taxes maximizing (6) can be progressive. Instead of looking 
at the solution of y , we allow it to be any value and obtain a stronger result. 
Proposition 2: Given any y , the optimal taxes to maximize the basic income B 
are either a single tax rate t* = 1/(1 + ε), or regressive.  
Proof: see Appendix B. 
 We then examine a general form of the max-min objective. In our model, if m 
> 0, the least productive households do work. The optimal labor supply yields utility 
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m(1 – t1)ε+1/(1+ε). The max-min objective is no longer the basic income B alone, but 
has this extra term. Then we have a general max-min objective: 
 u1 = 
1 
1(1 )
1
m t
ε
+
−
+
 + B       (7) 
 This expression covers Sheshinski’s earlier example. It is more likely to yield 
progressive taxes than B in (6) due to the extra term. A similar situation arises when 
the worst-off households are unemployed. Even though their utilities solely rely on 
the basic income, higher t1 tends to reduce employment and tax revenue. This effect 
may increase the appeal of progressive taxes and deserves close examination. One 
way to model unemployment is to introduce a fixed cost of working. Households 
work only when they obtain higher utility than this cost. Let z  be the lowest ONTE 
of working households. As households with z < z are unemployed, the tax revenue is 
reduced from (6) by t1(1 – t1)ε ( )
z
m
zdF z . So the utility of the unemployed becomes: 
 u2 = B − t1(1 – t1)ε ( )
z
m
zdF z       (8) 
 Moreover, unemployment can also arise due to a fixed unemployment benefit 
Bu, which will be lost if households work. A household works only when it obtains 
higher utility than this benefit. So Bu plays the same role as the fixed cost of working. 
The only difference is the additional income Bu, and a reduction of the basic income 
due to the unemployment payment, BuF( z ), which adds further incentives to lower t1 
than (8), hence more chances for progressive taxes. The utility of the unemployed is:
 
 u3 = B + Bu − t1(1 – t1)ε ( )
z
m
zdF z − BuF( z )    (9) 
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 Welfare functions (7) – (9) provide additional incentives to lower t1 than (6) 
due to extra terms, and hence more chances for progressive taxes. But these extra 
terms are not affected by y . If we follow Sheshinski and focus on the interior 
solution for y , they have no impact. We can still use B as the objective essentially, 
and show y  has no interior solution if taxes are progressive. To simply our proof, we 
use the over-valuated tax revenue B’ in (4). It gives the same value as the true tax 
revenue B in (6) when y  takes extreme values. If the maximization of B’ does not 
yield an interior solution for y , neither does B. 
 To obtain a clean result, however, we need to impose a mild restriction on 
income distribution functions. 
 Assumption: ( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 does not fall when z rises.  
 This assumption requires that f(z) does not fall with z too fast. It is not very 
restrictive as income distributions are usually continuous and change smoothly. In 
particular this assumption holds in all cases, which we will discuss later.  
Proposition 3: Under the Assumption, the optimal taxes cannot be progressive 
under the max-min objectives (7) – (9).  
Proof: see Appendix C. 
 In Sheshinski’s example, the wage (earning) distribution satisfies our 
assumption. Proposition 3 confirms 20% and 29% progressive taxes are not optimal.  
 Given Propositions 1 – 3, neither utilitarian nor max-min welfare functions 
can justify progressive taxes. This should not be too surprising. As utilitarian welfare 
does not favor income redistributions from the rich to the poor, it should not be 
expected to justify progressive taxes. The max-min objective only concerns the worst-
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off individuals, who are either unemployed or unproductive, and hence not much 
affected by the low-income tax. The objective is best achieved by maximizing the 
revenue, which favors regressive taxes due to different disincentive effects of t1 and 
t2. While t2 discourages the work effort of high-income earners for every penny it 
generates, t1 only has such an effect on low-income earners, and collects tax revenue 
from both. So it is optimal to set tax rate t1 higher than t2.  
 The failure to justify progressive taxes by utilitarian and max-min welfare 
functions does not mean that they should be dismissed generally. To evaluate the 
desirability of progressive taxes, we should look for alternative welfare functions. In 
the real world, the justification of progressive taxes is not to promote the interest of 
everyone or the worst-off individuals only, but to help the poor and working class. 
The low-income tax usually hurt them and this is why progressive taxes are preferred. 
Progressive taxes seem more justifiable if we maximize the utility of the poor.  
5. Total Utility of the Poor  
 Sheshinski (1989) argues that optimal taxes maximizing utilitarian welfare 
should be progressive if the poor and rich have very different marginal utilities of 
income. Slemrod et al (1994) recognize that progressive taxes may maximize a 
weighted utility of two groups of households. They point to the same factor. When we 
put low weights on the rich, their loss is unimportant relative to the gain by the poor, 
and progressive taxes are likely. In the extreme case we can assign zero weight to the 
rich, and only maximize the utility of the poor. This is consistent with the political 
agenda of helping the poor and may give the best chance for progressive taxes.  
 We assume that the government maximizes the total utility of poor households 
whose ONTE are below an exogenously given level e , which indicates the dividing 
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line between the poor and rich. When the government imposes progressive taxes, the 
poor should face the lower rate t1, not the higher t2. This can be achieved by setting 
the threshold income y  = e (1 – t1)ε. Then our independent decision variables are t1 
and t2 only. Given t1 < t2, poor households (z ≤ e ) choose x = wε(1 − t1)ε, and obtain 
utility z(1 – t1)ε+1/(1 + ε) + B. Integrating this utility over [m, e ], we get the total 
utility of the poor, which the government maximizes: 
 W1 = 
1 
1(1 )
1
t
ε
+
−
+
( )
e
m
zdF z  + F( e )B     (10) 
 We investigate whether taxes maximizing (10) can be progressive. To simplify 
notations, we denote ( )
e
m
zdF z  by E1, ( )
M
e
zdF z by E2, and E1 + E2 by E. Note that E is 
the average ONTE of the population. Further we let e1 denote E1/F( e ), and e2 denote 
E2/[1 – F( e )]. Note e1 and e2 are the average ONTE of the poor and rich respectively. 
From their definitions we always have e1 ≤ e  ≤ e2 and e1 ≤ E ≤ e2. All of them are 
determined by the income distribution and fixed e , independent of taxes. 
Proposition 4: Under the Assumption, the optimal taxes to maximize the total 
utility of the poor cannot be progressive if 
  e1e2 ≤ e E        (11) 
Proof: see Appendix D. 
We can write (11) as e1/E < e /e2, where both sides are unit free ratios. If the 
rich are very rich, e /e2 is low, (11) is unlikely to hold, and progressive taxes are 
possible. Conversely, if e2 ≈ e , the rich are barely richer than the top poor, (11) holds 
as e1 < E, and progressive taxes are impossible.  
 14 
 Given e /e2, (11) is more likely to hold when e1/E is low, i.e., the poor are very 
poor relative to the population. If e1 is close to zero, (11) must hold. By contrast, if the 
poor are quite “rich”, such that e1 is close to e , (11) must be violated as E < e2. It 
seems counter intuitive that optimal taxes tend to be regressive when the poor are very 
poor. The reason is the low earnings of the poor imply less loss when taxing them, 
and justify higher t1 to raise tax revenue.  
If we ignore the bunching behavior, it can be shown that (11) becomes a 
sufficient condition for progressive taxes as well. So it can be used approximately as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for progressive taxes if bunching is insignificant.  
It is not always easy to evaluate (11). We present an equivalent condition, 
which depends on the change in the ratio of average ONTE of the poor and the rich.  
Proposition 5: If f(z) > 0 around e , (11) holds if and only if e1/e2 rises with e .  
Proof: see Appendix E. 
Intuitively, a lower e1/e2 indicates a larger gap between the poor and the rich, 
and progressive taxes seem more plausible. However, it is the change, not the level of 
this ratio that matters. When e1/e2 is at its minimum, it will increase if e  rises, taxes 
cannot be progressive until the ratio reaches its peak. Then (11) holds with equality. 
Further rise in e  makes the ratio fall and the taxes may be progressive. In particular, 
if earnings are infinite, when e  approaches infinity, e1 is equal to E and e2 is infinite, 
so e1/e2 is zero. That means the ratio must be falling when e  is sufficiently large.  
Corollary: If earnings are infinite, (11) must be violated when e  is large. 
Recall that if bunching is negligible, (11) becomes a sufficient condition for 
progressive taxes. Then the Corollary implies that, if the rich are very rich and our 
goal is to help a large poor majority, progressive taxes are justifiable. 
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To illustrate how the validity of (11) depends on income distributions, we 
present plausible examples and look at a few cases with analytic solutions.  
Case 1: We first consider income distributions with finite earnings, where the 
lower and upper limits are normalized to 0 and 1. A simple density function is: 
f(z) = βzβ−1,     where β > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. 
This function satisfies our Assumption but is restricted to be monotonic. If β = 
1, it is a uniform distribution; if β < (>) 1, the density function decreases (increases) 
with z. (11) always holds3, which means progressive taxes are impossible.  
Case 2: Secondly, we consider a density function with infinite earnings. We 
assume a positive lower bound m = 1, and a decreasing density function.  
f(z) = (α − 1)z−α,    where α > 2, z ≥ 1. 
The Assumption holds. The shape of this distribution can be similar to Case 1. 
But the validity of (11) is very different. It never holds4 for e  > 1.  
Case 3: In the real world, the monotonic distribution is uncommon, and single 
peaked distributions are usually observed. We consider these cases now. We assume 
finite earnings between 0 and 1. Two density functions serve as examples. 
f(z) = ( 1)( 1)α ββ α
+ +
−
(zα – zβ),   where β > α > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. 
                                                
3
 We have F = 1
0
e
z dzββ −  = e β, E1 = 
0
e
z dzββ  = β e β+1/(1 + β), and E = β/(1 + β). Hence e1/E = e , 
and (11) becomes e2 ≤ 1, which is guaranteed. 
4F = (α –1)
1
e
z dzα−  = 1 – e 1−α, E1 = (α–1)
1
1
e
z dzα−  = (1– e 2−α)(α–1)/(α –2), and E = (α–1)/(α –2). 
So e1/E = (1– e 2−α)/(1– e 1−α), and e2 = e (α–1)/(α–2). (11) becomes (1– e 2−α)/(1– e 1−α) < (α–2)/(α–1). 
It requires e α−1− e (α−1)+α −2 ≤ 0. The function rises with e  from 0. So (11) never holds for e  > 1. 
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f(z) = 
1 1z (1 )
( , )
z
B
α β
α β
− −
−
,   where β, α > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. 
Both distributions satisfy the Assumption. The second is the Beta distribution, 
which allows monotonically increasing or decreasing density functions as well. Since 
m = 0, the ratio of e1/e2 must rise when e  is very low. But it may not always be so. To 
show this, we look at a special case of both distributions, f(z) = 6z(1 – z). It can be 
shown that (11) is violated if and only if 1 > e  > 5/6 approximately 5.  
Case 4: Next let us consider single peaked income distributions with infinite 
earnings. We first look at a case with a positive minimum ONTE m = 1.  
f(z) = ( 1)( 1)β αβ α
− −
−
(z−α – z−β),  where β > α > 2, z ≥ 1. 
The Assumption is again valid. It can be shown that (11) holds with equality 
when e  = 1, but is violated when e  approaches to infinity. To illustrate how (11) 
depends on e , we consider a special case with α = 3 and β = 4, i.e., f(z) = 6(z−3 – z−4). 
Then (11) holds if and only if e  ≤ 4/36, which is the mode of the distribution.   
Case 5: Finally, we consider single peaked income distributions with earnings 
covering all possible values. One such distribution often studied in the literature is the 
lognormal distribution. The Gamma distribution has similar properties. 
 f(z) = 1
2zσ pi
exp[–
2
2
(ln )
2
z µ
σ
− ]  where z > 0, σ > 0, −∞ < µ < ∞. 
                                                
5
 The mean E = 0.5 and F = e 2(3 – 2 e ). As E1 = e 3(2 – 1.5 e ), we have e1 = e (2 – 1.5 e )/(3 – 2 e ). 
Also, e2 = 0.5(1 + 2 e  + 3 e 2)/(1 + 2 e ). So (11) is (2 – 1.5 e )(1 + 2 e  + 3 e 2) < (1 + 2 e )(3 – 2 e ). It is 
1 + 1.5 e  – 7 e 2 + 4.5 e 3 = (1 – e )(1 + 2.5 e  – 4.5 e 2) ≥ 0, violated if and only if 1 > e  > 5/6 roughly.  
6
 We first get F = 1 – 3/ e 2 + 2/ e 3, and E1 = 3 − 6/ e  + 3/ e 2. Hence E = 3, e1 = 3 e /( e + 2), and e2 = 
E2/(1 – F) = 3 e (2 e – 1)/(3 e – 2). Thus (11) becomes 3 e (2 e – 1) < ( e + 2)(3 e – 2), or 3 e 2 – 7 e + 4 
= ( e – 1)(3 e  – 4) < 0. This holds when e  ≤ 4/3. 4/3 is the mode as f’(z) ≥ 0 if and only if z ≤ 4/3.  
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 f(z) = 
1
( )
zα
αα θ
−
Γ
exp(– z
θ
)  where z > 0, α, θ  > 0. 
 Both density functions satisfy our Assumption. Since e  covers the entire R+, 
e1/e2 rises from zero (0/E) and falls to zero (E/∞) at the end. (11) must hold when e  is 
small and be violated when e  is large. Though (11) is difficult to evaluate in general, 
for a lognormal distribution it is valid for a particular value of e , the median. This 
value is interesting because it divides the poor and rich equally. For any lognormal 
distribution (11) always holds when e  is equal to the median7.  
 A lognormal distribution has a median lower than the mean. If a distribution 
has a median larger than its mean, (11) always holds when e  is equal to the median8.  
 If (11) is violated, the optimal taxes may be progressive, but if the two tax 
rates are close, the advantage over a flat tax may not justify administrative costs. We 
can show that, if taxes are progressive, we have *2t  < (1 – e /e2)/(1 + ε – e /e2) (see 
Appendix D). The ratio decreases with e /e2. When e /e2 is close to 1, the ratio tends 
to be small. For instance, in the example of Case 3, the violation of (11) requires e  > 
5/6. But when e  = 5/6, we have e /e2 = 2e (1 + 2 e )/(1 + 2 e  + 3 e 2) ≈16/17 (see 
footnote 5). So *2t  must be less than 1/(1 + 17ε). Unless ε is very small, *2t  must be 
low, and significant tax progression is impossible. So a high value of e /e2 generally 
indicates the undesirability of progressive taxes. 
6. Weighted Utility of the Poor 
                                                
7
 The median is exp(µ), the mean E is exp(µ  + 0.5σ2), and E2 = Φ(σ)exp(µ  + 0.5σ2), where Φ(σ) is 
the cumulative distribution of the standard normal. So E1 = E – E2 =  [1 − Φ(σ)]exp(µ  + 0.5σ2). 
Substitute them and F = 0.5, (11) becomes 2[1 − Φ(σ)] < 0.5exp(−0.5σ2)/Φ(σ), or 4[1 − Φ(σ)]Φ(σ) − 
exp(–0.5σ2) < 0. It falls from zero and rises to zero as σ changes from zero to infinity. So (11) holds. 
8(11) becomes E1(E – E1)/ e E < ¼.  As e  ≥ E, this holds since (1 − E1/E)E1/E ≤ ¼ for any E1/E. 
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 When we maximize the total utility of the poor, we treat the poor equally. It 
seems more reasonable to give a continuous discrimination to the poor, favouring the 
poorest over the less poor. Given e  we can construct a weighted utility of the poor. 
We assign weight s(z) to poor households with z ≤ e , subject to ( ) ( )
e
m
s z dF z  = F( e ). 
Household z’s optimal work leads to utility z(1− t1)1+ε/(1+ε) + B. Multiply it with s(z) 
and integrate the product over [m, e ]. We get the weighted utility of the poor:  
 W2 = 
1 
1(1 )
1
t
ε
+
−
+
( ) ( )
e
m
s z zdF z  + F( e )B      (12) 
 This function covers (10) as a special case with s(z) = 1. Since we want to help 
the poor, we should not assign a lower weight to poorer households than less poor 
ones. So s(z) should not increase with z. Then the value of ( ) ( )
e
m
s z zdF z cannot exceed 
E1. If we divide it by F( e ), the ratio must lie between m and e1. The more weight on 
the poorer households, the closer the ratio is to m, while the less weight, the closer to 
e1. Dividing (12) by F( e ) and denoting ( ) ( )
e
m
s z zdF z /F( e ) by e , we have:  
 W3 = 
1 
1(1 )
1
e t
ε
+
−
+

 + B         (13) 
This function is identical to the utility of a poor household with ONTE e , 
which can be interpreted a representative household. To maximize (13) is equivalent 
to maximizing the utility of this representative household. This is also consistent with 
the political agenda to help a chosen type of family in the society. 
Proposition 6: The optimal taxes to maximize the weighted utility of the poor 
cannot be progressive if  
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 e e2 ≤ e E        (14) 
Proof: see Appendix F. 
The right hand side of (14) is the same as that in (11), but the left hand side is 
smaller as e  < e1. So (14) is more likely to hold. If (11) holds, no weighted utility of 
the poor can justify progressive taxes either. Thus (11) can be taken as a necessary 
condition for progressive taxes under most reasonable welfare functions. 
 Given e , the poorer household we choose (lower e ), the less likely are taxes 
to be progressive. For instance, in the example of Case 3, the violation of (11) 
requires e /e2 ≥ 16/17. As E = 0.5, (14) holds if e ≤ 8/17. Progressive taxes are 
possible only if the income of the target household is close to the average. Moreover, 
as shown in Appendix F, the lower limit of *1t  falls with e . The lower e  we choose, 
the higher *1t . If we target a very poor representative, even if the taxes are progressive, 
the progression tends to be small. This confirms our earlier finding that progressive 
taxes are unlikely to be justified by an objective to help the very poor. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we try to answer three questions. First we show that, progressive 
taxes are generally not justified by utilitarian and max-min welfare functions. This 
result clarifies some ambiguities in the existing literature and questions the general 
desirability of progressive taxes. However, it does not reject progressive taxes 
completely, because these two welfare functions are unlikely to justify progressive 
taxes and are not consistent with the usual political grounds for progressive taxes.  
 Our second goal is to evaluate the desirability of progressive taxes when we 
aim to help the poor exclusively. Under our new welfare functions, progressive taxes 
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are possible but still far from guaranteed. We provide necessary conditions for 
progressive taxes. The conditions only depend on aggregate features of income 
distributions, which indicate how poor the poor are relative to the population and how 
rich the rich are relative to the dividing line between the poor and rich.  
 This result allows us to fulfil our third goal, to evaluate the desirability of 
progressive taxes with feasible information. For instance, unbounded earnings, 
meaning that the rich are very rich, are likely to justify progressive taxes. The 
opposite is true when the rich are not so rich (high e /e2) or the poor are very poor 
(low e1/E). In particular if the former ratio is close to one, even if taxes are 
progressive, the difference between two tax rates will be small, and hence may not 
justify the extra administrative costs.  
 When two-band taxes are not better than a flat tax, a more complicated tax 
structure is unlikely to be so either, as administrative costs increase with the number 
of tax bands faster than the benefit of income redistribution. Then our result raises a 
general question about the desirability of progressive taxes under certain identifiable 
conditions. Our main contribution may be summarised as showing that, progressive 
taxes are optimal only under surprisingly restrictive conditions. 
 To ensure the tractability of the model, we assume a particular utility function 
with constant elasticity of labour supply and no income effects. It allows us to analyze 
the impact of income tax with general income distributions. Though it is restrictive, 
the compromise seems necessary to obtain clear results, and similar assumptions are 
often made in the existing literature. Though highly stylized, we hope that this paper 
contributes to the debate on a flat tax system combined with a basic income.   
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Appendix A, Proof of Proposition 1:   
We show that there does not exist an interior solution for y  if t2 > t1. When we 
differentiate (5) with respect to y , we can write ∂W/∂ y  as ∂W/∂ z ×∂ z /∂ y . When t2 
> t1, we have ∂ z /∂ y =1/(1 – t2)ε > 0. Hence ∂W/∂ y  = 0 only if ∂W/∂ z  = 0.  
We notice that ∂Z1/∂ z  = z f( z ) = −∂Z2/∂ z . So the first-order condition for y  is: 
W
z
∂
∂
 = [(1 + εt1)(1 – t1)ε – (1 + εt2)(1 – t2)ε] ( )1
zf z
ε+
 = 0  (A) 
As f(z) ≥ 0, (A) is non-negative if (1 + εt1)(1 – t1)ε > (1 + εt2)(1 – t2)ε. Differentiate 
function (1 + εt)(1 – t)ε, we get –ε(1 + ε)t(1 – t)ε−1 < 0.  So (1 + εt)(1 – t)ε falls with t. 
If t2 > t1, we have ∂W/∂ z  ≥ 0. W always increases with y  and no interior solution for 
y  exists. Thus the optimal y  must take an extreme value, which means the maximum 
level of (5) is obtained by a single tax rate. In this case, bunching cannot occur, the 
maximum (5) represents a feasible welfare level. Recall that the true welfare is lower 
than (5), except at the extreme values of y . It cannot exceed the maximum (5) under 
a single tax rate. So the optimal taxes cannot be progressive. 
Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 2:  
Given t2 > t1 and a fixed y , we differentiate B in (6) with respect to t1 and t2. Note 
that z  does not depend on t1 and e  does not depend on t2. Hence we get 
 
1
B
t
∂
∂
 = (1 – t1)ε[1 – (1+ε)t1] ( )
e
m
zdF z  + t1(1 – t1)ε e f( e )
1
e
t
∂
∂
  
 + y ( )
z
e
dF z  − t1 y f( e )
1
e
t
∂
∂
 + [1 – F( z )] y  = 0   (B1) 
 
2
B
t
∂
∂
 = (1 – t2)ε[1 – (1+ε)t2] ( )
M
z
zdF z  – t2(1 – t2)ε z f( z )
2
z
t
∂
∂
  
 + t1 y  f( z )
2
z
t
∂
∂
 − [1 – F( z )] y  + (t2 −  t1) y f( z )
2
z
t
∂
∂
  = 0  (B2) 
As (1 – t1)ε e  = (1 – t2)ε z  = y , (B1) and (B2) simplify to:  
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1
B
t
∂
∂
 = (1 – t1)ε[1 – (1+ε)t1] ( )
e
m
zdF z  + [1 – F( e )] y  = 0  (B3) 
 
2
B
t
∂
∂
 = (1 – t2)ε[1 – (1+ε)t2] ( )
M
z
zdF z  – [1 – F( z )] y = 0  (B4) 
Given 1 – F( e ) > 0, (B3) implies t1 > 1/(1+ε). Given 1 – F( z ) > 0, (B4) implies t2 < 
1/(1+ε). It is impossible to have t2 > t1. If t2 = t1, (6) simplifies to t(1 – t)ε ( )
M
m
zdF z . 
Hence the optimal tax rate is 1/(1+ε). 
Appendix C, Proof of Proposition 3:  
We first show that if *2t  > 
*
1t , there is no interior solution for y  to maximize B’ in (4). 
If such a solution exists, we must have ∂B’/∂ y  = 0, or ∂B’/∂ z ×∂ z /∂ y  = 0. As 
∂ z /∂ y > 0, we need ∂B’/∂ z  = 0. Substitute y  = (1 – t2)ε z  in (4), and differentiate it 
with respect to z , as ∂Z1/∂ z  = z f( z ) = −∂Z2/∂ z , we obtain 
'B
z
∂
∂
 = t2[(1 – t1)ε – (1 – t2)ε] z f( z ) – (t2 – t1)(1 – t1)ε[1 – F( z )] (C1) 
Since ∂ z /∂ y does not depend on y , ∂2B’/∂ y 2 = ∂2B’/∂ z 2×(∂ z /∂ y )2. So the sign of 
∂2B’/∂ y 2 is the same as that of ∂2B’/∂ z 2. We differentiate (C1) again and get: 
2
2
'B
z
∂
∂
 = t2[(1 – t1)ε – (1 – t2)ε][ z f’( z ) + f( z )] + (t2 – t1)(1 – t1)εf( z )(C2) 
Substitute (C1) into (C2), assuming f( z ) > 0, we find 
 
2
2
'B
z
∂
∂
 = (t2 – t1)(1 – t1)ε{[1 – F( z )] ( ) '( )( )
f z zf z
zf z
+
+ f( z )}          (C3)   
Note that [1 – F( z )][ z f’( z ) + f( z )] +  z [f( z )]2 ≥ 0 as zf(z)/[1 – F(z)] does not fall 
with z. Hence if t2 > t1, we have ∂2B’/∂ z 2 ≥ 0 when ∂B’/∂ z  = 0. So B’ does not reach 
its maximum for any interior y . The optimal y  has to be an extreme value, which 
means two taxes effectively become a flat tax. Recall that the true tax revenue B in (6) 
is lower than B’, but the difference disappears with a single tax. Hence the maximum 
B’ represents feasible tax revenue, and B cannot have an interior solution for y .  
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Appendix D, Proof of Proposition 4:  
(i) We first show that if *2t  > *1t , they must be interior solutions. In this proof, since 
F( e ) is constant, we just write it as F. Assuming *2t  > *1t , we substitute (1 – t1)ε e  = 
y  into (6), and write the basic income as:  
B = t1(1 – t1)ε[ ( )
e
m
zdF z + e (1–F)] + t2(1 – t2)ε ( )
M
z
zdF z  – t2(1 – t1)ε e [1 – F( z )] (D1) 
Note e  is constant, while z = e (1 – t1)ε/(1 – t2)ε. We substitute (D1) for B in (10) and 
differentiate it with respect to t1 and t2. Writing ( )
e
m
zdF z /F as e1, we get: 
1
1(1 )t
F
ε−
− 1
1
W
t
∂
∂
 = –(1 – t1)e1 + [1 – (1+ε)t1][E1 + e (1 – F)] + ε e t2[1 – F( z )]      (D2) 
 
1
F
1
2
W
t
∂
∂
 = (1 – t2)ε−1[1 – (1+ε)t2] ( )
M
z
zdF z  – (1 – t1)ε e [1 – F( z )]          (D3) 
When t1 = 0, we have ∂W1/∂t1 > 0 if –e1 + E1 + e (1 – F) > 0. As E1 = Fe1 and e  > e1, 
the inequality holds. Hence, if the optimal taxes are progressive, *1t  must satisfy the 
first-order condition ∂W1/∂t1 = 0. Similarly, we see ∂W1/∂t2 < 0 if t2 > 1/(1 + ε). So *2t  
must satisfy the first-order condition ∂W1/∂t2 = 0.  
(ii) We now show that if *2t  > *1t , we must have *2t [1 – F( z )] > *1t (1 – F). If W1 is 
maximized by *2t  and 
*
1t , B must be higher when t2 = 
*
2t  than t2 = 
*
1t . Note when t2 = 
*
1t , we have z = e . Then a higher B with t2 = 
*
2t  implies  
          
*
2t {(1– *2t )ε ( )
M
z
zdF z  – y [1 – F( z )]} > *1t [(1– *1t )ε ( )
M
e
zdF z  – y (1 – F)]    (D4) 
Note both sides of (D4) are positive. Then we have *2t [1 – F( z )] > *1t (1 – F) if  
 
*
2(1 ) ( )
1 ( )
M
z
t zdF z
F z
ε
−
−

 ≤  
*
1(1 ) ( )
1
M
e
t zdF z
F
ε
−
−

              (D5) 
Since (1 – *2t )ε z  = (1 – *1t )ε e , we can write (D5) as 
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( )
[1 ( )]
M
z
zdF z
z F z−

 ≤  
( )
(1 )
M
e
zdF z
e F−

 ≡ 
2e
e
               (D6) 
Given *2t  > 
*
1t , we have z > e . Then (D6) holds if e2/ e  does not rise or equivalently, 
e /e2 does not fall with e , which will be shown given our Assumption. 
(iii) As e /e2 = e [1 – F( e )]/E2, it does not fall with e  if its derivative with respect to 
e  is non-negative, i.e., E2[1 – F( e ) – e f( e )] + e 2f( e )[1 – F( e )] ≥ 0. Divide this 
inequality by e f( e )E2, we get 
 
1 ( )
( )
F e
ef e
−
 + 
2
e
e
 ≥ 1       (D7) 
If (D7) is violated for any e , e /e2 will fall as e  increases. Given the Assumption, we 
know [1 – F( e )]/[ e f( e )] does not rise with e . So (D7) will never hold as e  
continues to rise, and must be violated when e  = M.  
However, if M is finite, when e  = M, e /e2 must be equal to 1 and (D7) is valid. If M 
is infinite, e /e2 must converge to a limit, so its derivative must be zero. This implies 
the equality of (D7). As (D7) holds when e  = M, it cannot be violated for any e . 
Thus e /e2 never falls with e . So (D6) holds, and we have *2t [1 – F( z )] > *1t (1 – F). 
(iv) We now find the lower bound of *1t . If we substitute *1t (1 – F) for *2t [1 – F( z )] in 
(D2), it falls, and –(1 – *1t )e1 + [1 – (1+ε) *1t ][E1 + e (1 – F)] + ε e *1t (1 – F) < 0, i.e., 
 
*
1t  > 
1
1 1 /(1 )
e e
e e E Fε
−
− + −
      (D8) 
(v) Find the upper bound of *2t . As (1 – *2t )ε z  = (1 – *1t )ε e , we rewrite (D3) as 
 
1
F
1
2
W
t
∂
∂
 = z (1 – t2)ε[1 – F( z )]{ 2
2
1 (1 )
1
t
t
ε− +
−
( )
[1 ( )]
M
z
zdF z
z F z−

 – 1} (D9) 
Given (D6), if we replace ( )
M
z
zdF z /{ z [1 – F( z )]} by e2/ e , the right hand side of 
(D9) must increase. Hence we have [1 – (1+ε) *2t ]e2 – (1 – *2t ) e  > 0. It implies 
 
*
2t  < 
2
2(1 )
e e
e eε
−
+ −
       (D10) 
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Combining  (D8) and (D10), we find impossible to have *2t  > *1t  if  
 
1
1 1 /(1 )
e e
e e E Fε
−
− + −
 ≥ 2
2(1 )
e e
e eε
−
+ −
     (D11) 
(D11) reduces to e [(1 – F)e2 + E1) ≥ e2[(1 – F)e1 + E1]. As (1 – F)e2 = E2 and E1 = 
Fe1, we have e E ≥ e2e1.  
Appendix E, Proof of Proposition 5:  
Differentiating e1/e2 with respect to e , it is positive if and only if e2 1
e
e
∂
∂
 ≥ e1 2
e
e
∂
∂
. 
Recall that e1 = E1/F( e ), e2 = E2/[1 – F( e )], ∂F/∂ e  = f( e ) and ∂E1/∂ e  = e f( e ) = 
−∂E2/∂ e . Hence ∂e1/∂e  = [ e f( e )F( e ) – E1f( e )]/F( e )2 = f( e )[ e  – e1]/F( e ). Also, 
∂e2/∂e  = f( e ){E2 – [1 – F( e )] e }/[1 – F( e )]2 = f(e )[e2 – e ]/[1 – F( e )]. We 
substitute theses into the inequality. Given f( e ) > 0, the inequality holds if E2( e  – e1) 
≥ E1(e2 – e ). We can write it as E e  ≥ E1e2 + E2e1 = F( e )e1e2 + [1 – F(e )]e2e1 = e1e2. 
Appendix F, Proof of Proposition 6:  
As this proof is very similar to Appendix D, we only present it briefly. The argument 
regarding *2t  is identical to the earlier case. We focus on 
*
1t . Substitute (D1) into (13), 
and differentiate, we get the first-order condition: 
   (1 – t1)1−ε 3
1
W
t
∂
∂
 = –(1 – t1) e  + [1 – (1+ε)t1][E1 + e (1 – F)] + t2ε e [1 – F( z )] = 0(F1) 
If *2t  > 
*
1t , we have 
*
2t [1 – F( z )] > *1t (1 – F) (Appendix D). Replacing *2t [1 – F( z )] 
by *1t (1 – F) must lowers (F1). So –(1 – *1t ) e  + [1 – (1 + ε) *1t ][E1 + e (1 – F)] + 
ε e *1t (1 – F) < 0. Solving this inequality we get: 
 
*
1t  > 
1
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
E e F e
E e F eε
+ − −
+ + − −


        (F2) 
As shown in Appendix D, *2t  < (e2 − e )/[(1+ε)e2 − e ], so *2t  > *1t  is impossible if 
 
1
1
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
E e F e
E e F eε
+ − −
+ + − −


 ≥ 2
2(1 )
e e
e eε
−
+ −
    (F3) 
One can see that (F3) holds if and only if e E ≥ e2 e . 
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Appendix G (not for publication), Proof that the Assumption holds in the five cases: 
Case 1: f(z) = βzβ−1, where β > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Since F(z) = zβ, we have zf(z)/[1 – F(z)] = 
βzβ/(1 – zβ). It always rises with z, so the Assumption holds.  
 
Case 2: f(z) = (α −1)z−α, where α > 2, z ≥ 1. Since F(z) = 1 – z1−α, we get a constant 
zf(z)/[1 – F(z)] = α − 1. So the Assumption holds. 
 
Case 3: (i) f(z) = ( 1)( 1)α ββ α
+ +
−
(zα – zβ), where β > α > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. We first find F(z) 
= 
( 1)( 1)α β
β α
+ +
−
(
1
1
zα
α
+
+
 
− 
1
1
zβ
β
+
+
). It suffices to show the following ratio rises in z.   
 
( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 = (zα+1 − zβ+1)[
11
1
zα
α
+
−
+
 
− 
11
1
zβ
β
+
−
+
]−1    
 = [1 – zβ+1 – (1 – zα+1)][
11
1
zα
α
+
−
+
 
− 
11
1
zβ
β
+
−
+
]−1   (G1)  
Let x ≡ (1 – zα+1)/(1 – zβ+1), we can write (G1) as (1 – x)(
1
x
α +
 
− 
1
1β + ]
−1
. Obviously, 
(G1) falls with x. Hence it rises with z if x decreases with z, which we will show next. 
Differentiating x, we find dx/dz < 0 if –(1 + α)(1 – zβ+1)zα + (1 + β)(1 – zα+1)zβ < 0, or 
–(1 + α)(1 – zβ+1) + (1 + β)(zβ−α – zβ+1) = (1 + β)zβ−α – (β – α)zβ+1 – 1 – α  < 0. This 
function monotonically increases with z, and is equal to zero when z = 1. So the 
inequality holds for any z < 1. Thus (G1) rises with z, and the Assumption holds.  
 
(ii) f(z) = 
1 1z (1 )
( , )
z
B
α β
α β
− −
−
, where β, α > 0, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. F(z) = 1( , )B α β
1 1
0
(1 )z x x dxα β− −− . 
 
( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 =  zα(1 – z)β−1[B(α,β) − 1 1
0
(1 )z x x dxα β− −− ]−1  (G2) 
If α(1 – z) ≥ z(β – 1), (G2) must increases since zf(z) is non-decreasing with z. So we 
only need to consider the case of α(1 – z) < z(β – 1). Differentiating (G2), we see that 
it increases with z if and only if  
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 [B(α,β) − 1 1
0
(1 )z x x dxα β− −− ][α(1 – z) – z(β – 1)] + zα(1 – z)β > 0 (G3)  
Since α(1 – z) < z(β – 1), (G3) holds if and only if  
 L = B(α,β) − 1 1
0
(1 )z x x dxα β− −−  + 
(1 )
(1 ) ( 1)
z z
z z
α β
α β
−
− − −
< 0  (G4) 
Differentiating (G4) with respect to z, we get  
dL
dz
= { −1 + 2
[ (1 ) ( 1)][ (1 ) ] ( 1) (1 )
[ (1 ) ( 1)]
z z z z z z
z z
α β α β α β
α β
− − − − − + + − −
− − −
}zα−1(1 – z)β−1 
 = 2
( 1)
[ (1 ) ( 1)]z z
β
α β
−
− − −
zα(1 – z)β−1 
The condition α(1 – z) < z(β – 1) implies β > 1. So L increases with z. But when z = 1, 
L is zero. Hence it must be negative given 1 > z > α/(α + β – 1), and (G3) holds. 
 
Case 4: f(z) = ( 1)( 1)β αβ α
− −
−
(z−α  − z−β), where β > α > 2, z ≥ 1. We obtain F(z) = 1 + 
( 1)( 1)β α
β α
− −
−
(
1
1
z β
β
−
−
 − 
1
1
z α
α
−
−
). So 
 
( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 = (z1−α  − z1−β)[
1
1
z α
α
−
−
 − 
1
1
z β
β
−
−
]−1  
 
= (zβ−α  − 1)[
1
zβ α
α
−
−
 − 
1
1β − ]
−1
         (G5) 
Given β > α, (G5) rises with z, hence the Assumption holds.  
 
Case 5: (i) f(z) = 1
2zσ pi
exp[–
2
2
(ln )
2
z µ
σ
− ]  where z and σ > 0, −∞ < µ < ∞. 
We obtain F(z) = 0.5[1 + erf( ln
2
z µ
σ
− )], where erf(w) is defined as 2
pi
2
0
w te dt− . So 
 
( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 = 
2
σ pi
exp[–
2
2
(ln )
2
z µ
σ
− ][1 − erf( ln
2
z µ
σ
− )]−1  (G6) 
When lnz < µ, f(z) increases with z, the Assumption always holds. Hence, we let w = 
(lnz – µ)/( 2 σ). To show (G6) rises with z, we just need to show that function L = 
exp(w2)[1 − erf(w)] falls with w for w > 0. Differentiating L, we need to show that   
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dL
dw
= 2w×exp(w2)[1 − erf(w)] – 2
pi
 ≤ 0 or  
 S = w[1 − erf(w)] – 1
pi
exp(–w2) ≤ 0     (G7) 
Further differentiating function S with respect to w, we get  
dS
dw
= 1 − erf(w) – w×exp(–w2) + 2w
pi
 exp(–w2) = 1 − erf(w) + ( 2
pi
 − 1)w×exp(–w2). 
Since erf(w) ≤ 1 and 2 > pi ,  we know dS/dw > 0. Using l’Hopital’s rule, we see that 
w[1 − erf(w)] goes to zero when w approaches infinity. Since S is zero when w is 
infinite, and dS/dw > 0, we know that (G7) holds for any w.  
 
(ii) f(z) = 
1
( )
zα
αα θ
−
Γ
exp(– z
θ
), where z, α and θ  > 0. F(z) = 1( ) αα θΓ
1
0
exp( )z xx dxα
θ
−
 .  
 
( )
1 ( )
zf z
F z−
 =  zαexp(– z
θ
)[ ( ) αα θΓ  − 1
0
exp( )z xx dxα
θ
−
 ]
−1  (G8) 
If z ≤ αθ, (G8) must rises with z as zf(z) is non-decreasing. We only need to consider 
the case of z > αθ. Differentiating (G8), we see it increases with z if and only if  
 [ ( ) αα θΓ  − 1
0
exp( )z xx dxα
θ
−
 ]
zαθ
θ
−
 + zαexp(– z
θ
) > 0  (G9)  
Since z > αθ, (G9) holds if and only if  
 L = ( ) αα θΓ  − 1
0
exp( )z xx dxα
θ
−
  + z
θ
αθ −
zαexp(– z
θ
) < 0  (G10) 
Differentiating (G10) with respect to z, we get  
 
dL
dz
= −zα−1exp(– z
θ
) + 
1
2( )
z
z
αθ
αθ
−
−
exp(– z
θ
)[(αθ – z)(α – z
θ
) + z]  
 = 2( )
z
z
αθ
αθ −
exp(– z
θ
) > 0. 
Hence L is increasing for all z > αθ. But when z approaches infinity, L is zero. So it 
must be negative for all finite z > αθ, and (G8) cannot decrease with z. 
 
